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ABSTRACT 
A Secure Communication System for Early Childhood Collaboration System 
by 
Hao Kang, Master of Science 
Utah State University, Dec, 2014 
Major Professor: Dr. Stephen W. Clyde 
Department: Computer Science 
The Early Childhood collaboration System (ECCS) is a distributed health data 
system which provides coordinated, de-identified healthcare information to various 
types of data consumers. To satisfy this requirement, the ECCS needs a matcher that 
utilizes Personal Identifying Information (PII) to coordinate information from a wide 
range of data sources. Due to the sensitivity of PII, the ECCS also needs to guarantee 
that only matcher can access PII. This report describes a reusable subsystem, called 
Medical Records Secure Messaging (MRSecureMessaging), which utilizes a reliable 
cryptographic algorithm to encrypt PII and other confidential data so that matcher and 
data consumers cannot access each other’s data. It also contains a customized 
authentication protocol that allows data sources to verify the intended recipient. 
(64 pages) 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A collaborative person information system (CPIS) is a software system that 
integrates and coordinates data from a diverse set of data sources in a way that allows 
various data consumers to have de-duplicated and unified views of all that is known 
about a person across those data sources. In healthcare, a CPIS deals with patients’ 
personal identifying information (PII), their health histories, medical conditions, 
clinical data, lab results, economic data, and much more. This kind of information is 
extremely valuable for social and medical research, but is also very sensitive data. 
A CPIS must secure data carefully to guarantee privacy and confidentiality. 
Privacy, in the context of healthcare, is the patient’s right to determine who see his or 
her information and for purposed they must use it [24]. Confidentiality is the system’s 
responsibility of ensure that no unauthorized person accesses a person’s data and that 
authorized person only use it for the prescribed purposes [24]. Security is the policies, 
physical protections, and electronic protections that an organization uses to enforce 
confidentiality [24]. In essence, privacy of an individual’s health information depends 
on the amount of control and level of confidentiality that a health data system affords, 
which in turn depends on the security measures that stewards of the health data 
system implemented. 
The Utah Department of Health (UDOH) contracted with Utah State University 
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(USU) to build a distributed health data system, called Early Childhood Collaboration 
System (ECCS), that reuses and extends a CPIS, namely the Public Health Master 
Patient Index or phMPI. ECCS’s high-level requirements include: 
• collecting child health care and educational data from 11 distinct data 
sources (participants) with the possibility of expanding set several times 
over, 
• correlating that data so an individual’s records from one source matches 
his/her records from other sources without duplicates, 
• de-identifying that combined data, and then, 
• sending those correlated data to a data consumer, which will store them in a 
data warehouse for later analysis. 
Figure 1-1 and Figure1-2 provide a high-level architectural view of ECCS. The 
orange components represent the data sources; the purple components are the CPIS, 
which handles the data correlation and transmission; and the green components 
represent a target data consumer. 
As mentioned above, the initial system will have 11 data sources. Table 1-1 
lists these sources. Each data source uses a different kind of database manager and 
different data scheme. The heterogeneities among the data sources are an interesting 
problem, but beyond the scope of this report. 
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Figure 1-1: phMPI Components 
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Figure 1-2: ECCS Components 
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Table 1-1: Data sources that need to feed ECCS (at the time of the report) 
Agency Software System(s) 
Early Intervention – Part C BTOTS 
Child Care CC 
Foster Care FC 
Head Start Multiple Systems 
Help Me Grow HMG 
Early Hearing Detection and Intervention HiTrack 
Office of Home Visiting OHV 
United Way UW 
Utah State Wide Immunization Information System USISS 
Office of Vital Records and Statistics VS 
Utah State Office of Education UTREx 
     As mentioned above, the CPIS for ECCS is the phMPI, see Figure 1-1. The 
phMPI is itself a distributed system, designed around a service-oriented architecture 
and built on top of Vitruvian framework. Vitruvian was initially built at USU by a 
master student to facilitate object distribution and inter-object communications [22], 
but USU licenses it to a company, namely Multimedia Data Services Corporation, for 
commercialization. More information about Vitruvian framework is provided in 
Chapter 2 Section 2.3. 
The phMPI includes several types of independent services or agents. First, there 
5 
 
are Data Monitors for each data source. A Data Monitor periodically checks its data 
source for new or changed records and sends processing requests to a central Request 
Queue when it detects such events. A Workflow Manager grabs the processing 
requests out of the Request Queue and executes a specific Workflow for each one, 
depending on the type of request, the data source, and what kinds of data a consumer 
needs to know about that new or changed record. The Workflow may involve any 
number of actions, including matching person identities with those from other data 
sources, querying additional person data from the data source on which the event was 
detected, extracting person data from other data sources, merging all of the person’s 
data in a combined person snapshot, and publishing that snapshot to one or more data 
consumers. 
Out of necessity, matching operations require PII to find person identities from 
other data sources that represent the same person as the one for which a new or 
changed event was detected. In other words, the phMPI needs to know certain amount 
confidential information. However, it doesn’t need to have access to complete health 
histories, medical conditions, clinic data, lab results, or other personal details. 
To handling the querying of additional person data, the phMPI includes Pull 
Agents that can retrieve, in real time, a snapshot of given person’s data, specific its 
data source. There is a custom-configured Pull Agent for every data source. 
The publishing of combined person snapshots is handled through Push Agents, 
one configured for each possible data consumer. For ECCS, the data consumer of 
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interest is the EC Data Analysis System shown in Figure 1-2. When publishing, the 
Workflow Manager first sends a combined person snapshots to the EC Push Agent, 
which in turn sends them to the Translator inside the EC Data Analysis System 
(ECDS). The Translator transforms the incoming data into its own format and 
converts any embedded terminology into its own lexicon using a Terminology Service, 
and sends the resulting data onto the Data Loader, which then stores it in the EC Data 
Warehouse (ECDW). A Report Generator accesses that data through a Data Access 
Service to create interesting reports that highlight possible trends child health or 
healthcare. 
For the ECCS to guarantee privacy and confidentiality, it has to satisfy the 
following requirements. 
1. The phMPI should only have access to the minimal amount of PII that is 
needed to accurately match person identities. In other word, the phMPI 
should not have access to health histories, medical conditions, clinic data, 
lab result, economic data, or any other details not specifically need for 
record matching. 
2. When a Pull Agent extracts data intended for only the EC Data Analysis 
System (as requested by a Workflow), ECCS must ensure that only the EC 
Data Analysis System can access that data. Similarly, if a Pull Agent 
extracts data from other data sources, then ECCS must guarantee that only 
those intended data consumers can access the data. 
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3. ECCS must allow individuals to opt out of sharing any type of data with any 
of the possible data consumers. 
This report describes the development of such subsystem named the Medical 
Records Secure Messaging (MRSecureMessaging) that addresses the first two 
requirements. The thirds is handled by another subsystem called Consent 
Management System [23]. MRSecureMessaging includes a customized authentication 
protocol that allows data sources to verify the intended recipient. It also utilizes a 
reliable cryptographic algorithm to encrypt confidential data that phMPI and other are 
not allowed to view. Different recipients’ data would be encrypted by different keys 
so they cannot see each other’s data. These two features work together to satisfy the 
first two requirements.  
Figure 1-3 provides a high-level architectural view of the MRSecureMessaging. 
The red components represent the MRSecureMessaging’s encryptors and decryptors. 
When a Pull Agent tries to grab data, data source first lets the Encryptor encrypt it. 
The Encryptor uses asymmetric cryptography to handle this (more information about 
asymmetric cryptography is provided in Chapter 2 Section 2.2). As mentioned above, 
it encrypts PII with phMPI’s key and other confidential data with ECCS’s key. In this 
way, when the data arrives at phMPI, the Matcher can only decrypt PII with its own 
key. It then uses this information to finish correlating. Matcher doesn’t have access to 
other data since it doesn’t have the corresponding secret key to decrypt it. When 
correlating and merging process is done, the Push Agent sends a combined person 
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snapshot encrypted with ECCS’ key to the Translator. Translator decrypts incoming 
data with its own key and then transforms data into its own format. Finally, the Data 
Loader sends transformed data to the ECDS. 
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Figure 1-3: Encryptors and Decryptors in the phMPI and ECCS 
So far we have a clear understanding of the ECCS and the 
MRSecureMessaging’s requirements. Chapter 2 provides sufficient background 
knowledge related with them. Then Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical design of 
MRSecureMessaging. Chapter 4 covers the system analysis of MRSecureMessaging. 
With the information from these two chapters, I illustrate the architectural design in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses technique details of the implementation and Chapter 7 
mainly focuses on the testing process. Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarize the 
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contribution of the MRSecureMessaging and possible future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
The ECCS is dealing with healthcare data, so it is essential to understand the 
confidentiality of healthcare data to appreciate the contribution of this paper. Section 
2.1 provides some high-level background in area. As a subsystem of both the phMPI 
and ECCS, the MRSecureMessaging encrypts PII and other confidential data with 
public key cryptographic algorithm. It also contains a customized public key 
authentication protocol to ensure secure communication. Section 2.2 first explains 
what a cryptographic algorithm is. It then introduces the concept of authentication 
protocol and lists three main attacks to authentication protocol. Both phMPI and the 
MRSecureMessaging are built on top of the Vitruvian framework; having some 
knowledge about it is necessary. Section 2.3 gives a high-level overview of the 
Vitruvian framework. 
2.1 Confidentiality of healthcare data 
Person’s healthcare data must keep confidential and be handled carefully for the 
following reasons: 
First of all, healthcare data is person’s privacy. Person’s healthcare data 
contains PII, such as names, gender, birth date, parents, siblings, children, race, 
ethnicity, residential location, medical identifiers, and contact information. In general, 
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PII is any data that can be used by itself or in conjunction with other information to 
identify an individual. An organization should only request PII if the PII is absolutely 
necessary [25]. The Likelihood of harm caused by a breach involving PII is greatly 
reduced if an organization minimizes the amount of PII it uses, collects and stores 
[25]. 
Some cases, a person’s health history data or medical conditions could also be 
used to determine identity; but these kinds of information are not typically used by 
records matchers, so we put them in the category of confidential non-PII data. Besides 
a health history and medical conditions, a person’s non-PII data may include all kinds 
of details and very sensitive information, such as medications, clinical data, lab results, 
and economic or financial data. At an individual level, this data is extremely sensitive 
and must be keep confidential.  
Organizations can de-identify records by removing enough PII such that the 
remaining information does not identify an individual and there is no reasonable basis 
to believe that the information can be used to identify an individual [25]. 
De-identified records can be used when full records are not necessary [25]. In ECCS, 
a data source sends de-identified snapshots of these kinds of information to the ECDS 
in a way that guarantees that others, and even the phMPI, cannot access them. Then, 
the ECDS only allows these data to be reported on in aggregate so no single 
individual data can be view directly. 
Secondly, any data requestor must strictly abide by the data-sharing agreement 
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its steward agency has with the data source. A data-sharing agreement is legal 
agreement that defines the terms of data access [26]. It may include:  
• Intent and scope of data sharing 
• Potential benefits (including projected efficiencies) and risks of sharing, 
benefits and risks of not sharing , and methods to monitor these benefits 
and risks 
• Methods that will be used to share data and roles and responsibilities of 
staff involved 
• Minimum data elements needed to achieve the objective(s), including need 
for PII 
• Steps that will be taken to ensure the confidentiality and security of shared 
data 
• Provisions for physical and electronic security 
• How shared data will be used, analyzed, published, released, and 
retained/destroyed 
• Confidentiality agreements 
• Knowledge and training requirements including annual training for staff 
who have access to PII and non-PII data 
ECCS has data-sharing agreement with its 11 data sources to share all kinds of 
patient data, but phMPI only has data-sharing agreements that grant it access to PII. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the ECCS collects data from a wide range of data sources 
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and reuses phMPI’s matcher to correlate that data. When multiple medical records 
with the same patient name come to the matcher, the phMPI uses PII to determine 
whether these records belong to the same person. So, the systems must ensure that the 
phMPI cannot access non-PII data as it flows from the data sources through the 
phMPI to ECCS.  
Finally, federal laws such as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act and Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, limit the use of 
healthcare data. But this is beyond the scope of this report. 
2.2 Introduction to Secure Communications 
Secure communications are needed when two principals exchange messages 
and want to guarantee that a third party cannot access the message content, modify 
that content, or reproduce/resend it [20]. One way to realize secure communication is 
hiding the content or nature of messages, namely encryption. In addition, secure 
communications also requires each of the principals to authenticate their identity so 
other principal has some assurance that it communicates with the right entity. An 
authentication protocol can address this requirement. 
2.2.1 Overview of Encryption and cryptographic algorithm 
Encryption is the process of encoding messages or information in such a way 
that only authorized parties can read it [28]. A concept closely related with encryption 
is cryptographic algorithm. In an encryption scheme, the message or information, 
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referred to as plaintext, is encrypted using a cryptographic algorithm, generating 
ciphertext that can only be read if decrypted [27]. 
Cryptographic Algorithms can roughly be divided into three different types: 
Symmetric Key Cryptography, Public Key Cryptography and One-way Hash 
Algorithm [1]. 
Symmetric Key Cryptography is a class of algorithms that use the same 
cryptographic keys for both encryption and decryption [2]. To ensure security of 
communication, keys are kept secret between the communicating principals [1]. 
However the requirement that both principals have access to the key is one of the 
main drawbacks of symmetric key cryptography [2]. Carelessness of either principal 
will make key to compromise. Modern-day symmetric key algorithms are principally 
block ciphers or stream ciphers [1]. A block cipher will encrypt a block of (typically 
64 or 128) plaintext bits at a time. The best known block cipher is the Data 
Encryption Standard [7]. In contrast, stream ciphers encrypt one bit of plaintext at a 
time.  
Public Key Cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, is a class of 
algorithms that require two separate keys, one of which is secret (or private) and the 
other is public [3]. The public key is made publicly available but the principal would 
never reveal its private key. Although different, the two parts of this key pair are 
mathematically linked [3].Unlike symmetric key cryptography, in public key 
cryptography there is no shared secret between communicating parties [1]. Usually 
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(but not always) public key is used for encrypt information and secret key is used for 
decrypt. In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published the first paper on 
this topic [4]. The most widely known public key algorithm was developed by Rivest, 
Shamir and Adleman [5] and is universally referred to as RSA. Comparing to 
symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography’s encryption speed is 
considered slower. 
One-way Hash Algorithm maps an input to a hash value of specific length. This 
hash value is often referred to as a digest. The mapping of inputs to digests is one-way; 
so it is practically impossible to recreate an input from its hash value alone. It is also 
infeasible to find two inputs with the same hash values. Hence, the recipient of a 
message could use a hash algorithm to yield its own digest, and then compare this 
digest with the received digest to check whether the received message was modified. 
This type of algorithms is intended for use in conjunction with cryptography to 
provide signatures [1]. 
2.2.2 Overview of Authentication Protocols 
Before introducing authentication protocol, we need to understand another 
concept first, namely that of a cryptographic protocol. A cryptographic protocol is an 
abstract or concrete protocol that performs a security-related function and applies 
cryptographic algorithm [29]. Cryptographic protocols are widely used for secure 
application-level data transport. An authentication protocol is a type of cryptographic 
protocol with the purpose of authenticating entities wishing to communicate securely 
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[30]. 
According to the cryptographic algorithm taken, authentication protocols could 
be categorized into two main types: symmetric key protocol and public key protocol. 
Further distinctions are made on whether they use trusted third parties (TTP) or not. 
Notice that authentication protocols could also be categorized by many other different 
ways, but we will not discuss them in this report. 
The first type is Symmetric Key Protocol without TTP. This type of protocol 
operates purely between two communicating principals that wish to achieve some 
mode of authentication [1]. Communicating principals need to share a key before 
sending messages to each other. Keys may be generated by a trusted organization and 
send to each principal individually. This requirement restricts them from changing the 
shared key frequently. Once the key is compromised, a malicious principal could keep 
eavesdropping on the network until they change it.  
To improve this, the second type, Symmetric Key Protocol with TTP, was 
introduced. This type of protocol uses TTP to carry out some agreed function [1]. 
Usually third parties are trusted for key generation and distribution, but they may be 
trusted for activities other than that. With TTP, principals could change shared keys 
every time they plan to communicate so security is improved. 
The third type is Public Key Protocol. This type of protocol also needs TTP to 
distribute principals’ public key. When a principal wants to talk to another principal, it 
needs to get the other one’s public key from TTP first. Then use this public key to 
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encrypt messages. On the other side, the recipient is able to decrypt messages with its 
own secret key.  
As mentioned above, public key cryptographic algorithms are usually slower 
than symmetric key cryptographic algorithms. This also restricts the efficiency of 
corresponding protocols. To achieve a better efficiency without compromising 
security too much, Hybrid Protocol was introduced. This type of protocol uses both 
public and symmetric key cryptography. The trick is exchanging symmetric 
encryption keys using public key cryptography. 
Protocols can fail in many different ways. The following paragraphs discuss 
three main types of attack related with secure communication. 
Freshness attacks. A freshness attack occurs when a message (or message 
component) from a previous run of a protocol is recorded by an intruder and replayed 
as a message component in the current run of the protocol [1]. This type of attack 
could be fixed by the use of timestamps. Every time when a principal receives a 
message, it first checks whether the timestamp is within an allowable clock skew or 
not. If yes, it responds that message. If no, it discards that message and logs an error. 
Man-in-the-middle. This type of attacks is a form of active eavesdropping in 
which the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays 
messages between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each 
other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by 
the attacker [21]. A man-in-the-middle attack can succeed only when the attacker can 
18 
 
impersonate each endpoint to the satisfaction of the other. This enlightens us that to 
prevent this attack, we need to find a way to stop impersonating. Chapter 3 discusses 
this in details. 
Guessing attacks. This type of attacks happens when the intruder grains useful 
information from communicating messages and then uses this information to verify 
his guess. This attack can be very dangerous when the intruder has powerful 
computational resource and is able to verify his guess off-line. To avoid this attack, 
the protocol designers need to ensure that data available to intruder is sufficiently 
unpredictable [8]. 
2.3 Overview of the Vitruvian Framework 
Technologies and frameworks that support communication, distribution, and 
replication for distributed systems are not new. However they all suffer from one 
problem which is exposing too much communication and distribution details to 
developers. Vitruvian is a service-oriented distribution framework that tries to 
minimize developers’ effort to distribute objects, without compromising functionality, 
extensibility, good modularization, performance, or maintainability. 
Vitruvian mainly handles two challenges:  
1. Designing new distributed systems from the ground up 
2. Accommodating new requirements for distribution in mid development 
stream. 
MRSecureMessaging is built on top of Vitruvian, which help the developer 
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achieve a reasonable degree of access, location, and communication transparencies. 
Transparency is defined as the concealment from the user and the application 
programmer of the separation of components in a distributed system, so that the 
system is perceived as a whole rather than as a collection of independent components 
[16]. The implications of transparency are a major influence on the design of the 
system software [16]. Specifically, access transparency enables local and remote 
resources to be accessed using identical operations [16]. Location transparency 
enables resources to be accessed without knowledge of their physical or network 
location [16]. Communication transparency enables different parties to communicate 
without knowing the low-level details. Vitruvian distributes objects using dynamically 
generated proxies which are specializations of the application classes. Vitruvian also 
provides various synchronization patterns for proxies. Chapter 6 Section 6.1 provides 
this information in details. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL DESIGN 
The MRSecureMessaging adapts and extends Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol for authentication and encryption. It also utilizes the public key cryptography 
to enforce the data access constraint. Considering sensitive data is distributed and 
exchanged, the protocol must be stable. Unfortunately, some protocols are found to be 
flawed many years after their publications. Actually Needham-Schroeder protocol 
itself is an example. Lowe found a flaw (will be discussed in Section 3.3) 17 years 
after it was first published. However after many corrections and refinements, it is now 
considered a reliable protocol. 
Secondly, public key cryptography algorithms can provide better secrecy and 
access control. It could cause serious consequences once children’s healthcare 
information is compromised. The MRSecureMessaging and the ECCS must guarantee 
data’s privacy, confidentiality and security. More importantly, public key algorithms 
can easily handle data access issues. Different data is encrypted with different 
viewer’s public keys; only corresponding private keys could decrypt it. Getting others’ 
private keys is very hard since private keys are never distributed through network and 
always stored safely by their owner (Symmetric keys are distributed through network 
and therefore have greater chance to compromise). In sum, although public key 
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algorithms are generally slower than symmetric key algorithms, considering the 
problems mentioned above, it is still preferred. Also considering that computing 
power is increasing rapidly, the speed of encryption and decryption is acceptable. 
Finally, using public key algorithm simplifies the communication flows. 
Suppose a symmetric key algorithm is used, then data sources need to communicate 
with phMPI and ECDS individually to distribute their symmetric keys (generated by a 
key server), which in turns increases the MRSecureMessaging’s complexity. In 
contrast, when public key algorithm is used, data sources only need to communicate 
with phMPI. 
Section 3.1 introduces the notational conventions used in this report; Section 
3.2 reviews the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol; Section 3.3 lists a few 
modifications to the original protocol and explains the reasons; Section 3.4 gives a 
summary of the MRSecureMessaging’s theoretical design. 
3.1 Notational Conventions 
In this report, I use the notation {M}PK(A) to denote the result of encrypting 
message plaintext M with public key of principal A. PK stands for public key and SK 
stands for secure key. In general, capitals denote principals, such as A, B, S (for a 
server) and I (for an Intruder). A sends a message M1 to B would be denoted like this: 
AB: M1 
Na denotes a random number generated by principal A. Such numbers are 
intended to be used only once for the purposes of the current run of the protocol and 
22 
 
are generally termed nonces [1]. Ca denotes a confounder generated by principal A. 
Section 3.3 will explain this concept in details. 
A message may have several components; some will be plaintext and some will 
be encrypted. Message components will be separated by commas. Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) sequence diagram is used to describe protocols’ message flows. 
3.2 Introduction to Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol 
Needham and Schroeder proposed this protocol in 1978 [6]. Figure 3-1 
illustrates the message flows of the protocol. 
 
Figure 3-1: Needham-Schroeder public key protocol 
In this protocol, server S stores all principals’ public keys and distributes them 
when request is received. Principal A first uses Messages 1, 2 to obtain principal B’s 
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pubic key. A then encrypts a nonce and its own identifier with by B’s public key. B 
receives Message 3 and decrypts it to obtain A’s nonce. Similarly, B uses Message 4, 5 
to obtain A’s public key. After that, B forms its own nonce and encrypts both nonces 
with A’s public key as Message 6. A decrypts Message 6 and knows that B is 
operational and has responded. The reason is that B is the only one who has necessary 
information to create Message 6. A then encrypts Nb using B’s public key and sends 
back to B. B then decrypts and checks if Message 7 contains its nonce. If the answer is 
yes, B concludes that A is operational and indeed initiated the protocol. 
However, Gavin Lowe showed that this protocol flawed relative to 
man-in-the-middle attacks [9]. Other than that, it also needs some modifications to 
fulfill security requirements in the ECCS. These will be discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Customized Authentication Protocol for the MRSecureMessaging 
This section covers several modifications to Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol. 
3.3.1 Adding timestamps into messages 
The purpose of timestamp is to make ensure the “freshness” of a message. Each 
message should contain a timestamp in it. Then, if a message is not received within an 
allowable clock skew, the recipient can discard it and log a failure. Freshness attacks 
are therefore avoided. 
3.3.2 Fixing a man-in-the-middle attack 
 As mentioned above, 
public key protocol is susceptible to man
this kind of attack, where 
communication. A sends the nonce 
start another session with 
Although I could not decrypt this 
Finally A decrypts this message and return 
it to B. B believes that he has
Figure 3-2: A man-in
To prevent this attack, Lowe suggested including the identity of the responder 
within the encrypted part of Message 3
message of the original protocol)
since A is expecting a message containing 
Gavin Lowe has showed that to Needham
-in-the-middle attack. Figure 
A tries to communicate with B, but I intrudes on that 
Na encrypted with I’s key. I could impersonate 
B. B replies with a new nonce Nb encrypted with 
message, he could simply replay this message to 
Nb to I, I decryptes the message and return 
 correctly carried out a run of protocol with 
-the-middle attack to Needham-Schroeder public key protocol
 (the third message in Figure 3
. In this way, intruder I cannot successfully replay it 
I’s identity. The new Message 
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Needham-Schroeder protocol looks like this: 
BA: {Na, Nb, B}PK(A) 
3.3.3 Adding confounders into messages 
A confounder is distinct from a nonce in that it has no purpose other than to 
confound guessing attack. The value of a confounder may be ignored by the recipient 
of the message in which it appears [9]. With the help of confounder, it is very difficult 
for the intruder to verify his guessing so that guessing attacks could be avoided. 
Suppose there is an intruder in the system. He may record Message 6 and try to 
guess the secret key of A to decrypt this message. Then he can get Na’, Nb’ and B’. If 
B’ = B, this guessing might be correct, he could generate two messages: {Na’, A}PK(B) 
and {Nb’}PK(B). By comparing these two messages with Message 3 and Message 7, the 
intruder could verify his guessing (see Table 3-1). 
This is a dangerous attack since the process of guessing can be done offline. 
The intruder may have very powerful computing recourse to make guessing and 
verifying. To avoid from this attack, confounders are added to the messages to stop 
the intruder from verifying his guessing (see the last column of Table 3-1). “⊕” 
stands for XOR. Suppose an intruder decrypts new Message 6 with his guessing key, 
he could get (Na⊕Ca1)’ and Nb’, but there is no way for him to verify his guessing due 
to the changings of Message 3 and Message 7. Therefore, guessing attacks are 
avoided. 
 Table 3-1
Message # Original messages
Message 3: {Na, A}
Message 6: {Na, N
Message 7: {Nb
Figure 3-3 depicts the customized Needham
(notice that confounders have been added into messages).
Figure 3-3: Customized Needham
3.4 Summary 
Figure 3-4 describes a high level summary of the MRSecureMessaging 
(coordinating process is not included in this diagram since that is not part of the 
: Fixed messages in Needham-Schroeder protocol
 Intruder’s messages Fixed messages
PK(B) {Na’, A}PK(B) {Na, A, C
b, B}PK(A) N/A {Na⊕C
}PK(B) {Nb’}PK(B) {Nb⊕C
-Schroeder public key protocol
 
-Schroeder public key protocol
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a1, Ca2, Ta1}PK(B) 
a1, Nb, B, Tb1}PK(A) 
a2, Ca3, Ta2}PK(B) 
 
 
 
 MRSecureMessaging)
1. A requests B
2. KeyServer S
3. A authenticates 
4. A encrypts Data1
5. A sends data to 
6. B authenticates 
7. B sends Data2
Figure 3-4
. The working flow is as follow: 
 and C’s public key separately. 
 replies A with corresponding public keys. 
B with customized Needham-Schroeder public key protocol.
 and Data2 with B’s public key and C’s public key.
B. 
C with customized Needham-Schroeder public key protocol.
 to C. 
: A high level summary of the MRSecureMessaging
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CHAPTER 4 
SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
System analysis is“the process of studying a procedure or business in order to 
identify its goals and purposes and create systems and procedures that will achieve 
them in an efficient way” [10]. Specifically, in software engineering, the purpose of 
system analysis is to understand and document the essential characteristics of the 
system being studied. However, these types of documents could be highly-abstracted 
and hard to understand. I used UML diagrams to visualize the system analysis and 
again here to communicate the analysis to the readers. The UML is a general-purpose 
modeling language which is designed to provide a standard way to visualize the 
design of a system [11]. 
The use-case diagrams in Section 4.1 provide a high-level overview of actor 
and its goals. The class diagrams in Section 4.2 summarize the key objects in the 
system and their relationships to each other from an analysis perspective. The 
functional requirements listed in Section 4.3 details these goals. Non-functional 
requirements listed in Section 4.4 specify the criteria that can be used to judge the 
operation of the system. 
4.1 Actor Goals 
The actor is any external entity that has an interest in interacting with the 
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system. Often, it is a human user of the system, but it can also be another system or 
some kind of hardware device that needs to interact with the system [11]. Actor’s 
goals are captured by use-case diagrams. A use-case diagram shows actors, use cases 
and their relationships [11]. 
Three main actors closely relate with the MRSecureMessaging. Figure 4-1, 4-2 
and 4-3 describe their primary goals. 
 
Figure 4-1: Data sources’ primary goals 
Data sources have three primary goals. First, they need to authenticate MPI to 
make sure healthcare data is sent to the “right” place. Second, they should be able to 
encrypt data. This goal includes two sub goals. In short, data sources needs to encrypt 
different data with different recipients’ public keys. Third, data sources need to deliver 
healthcare data to the ECDW through MPI since the data needs to be coordinated and 
de-identified in MPI. 
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Figure 4-2: MPI’s primary goals 
MPI has four primary goals. First, similar to data sources, it needs to 
authenticate the ECDW. Second, it should have access to PII; this one includes 
decrypting received data with its own private key. Third, it must not have access to 
other confidential healthcare data. Fourth, it needs to deliver coordinated, 
de-identified data to the ECDW. 
 
Figure 4-3: ECDW’s primary goals 
The ECDW only has one goal, namely the receiving of coordinated, 
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de-identified data from MPI. This goal includes one sub goal that it needs to be able 
to decrypt received data with its own private key. 
4.2 Object-oriented Structural Analysis 
Structural analysis could give developers a better understanding of a system’s 
components and structure. UML class diagrams are used to illustrate such analysis. A 
class diagram describes the static view of a system in terms of classes and 
relationships among the classes [11]. Class diagrams are not just for visualizing and 
documenting structure models, but also for constructing an executable system. An 
object-oriented programming language can directly implement a class, making the 
class diagram one of the core diagrams for generating code and making UML 
executable [11]. 
 
Figure 4-4: Class diagram of the MRSecureMessaging 
Figure 4-4 shows the class diagram of the MRSecureMessaging. KeyService 
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stores keys generated by KeyGenerator and distributes them when key requests are 
received. Clients use messages to request keys from KeyService; they also use 
messages to communicate with each other. Each client also has relations with three 
other classes: Encryptor, Decryptor and RandomNumGenerator. The first two’s jobs 
are handling cryptography and the last is used to generate nonces and confounders. 
The following subsections describe the purpose of these classes and design 
considerations. 
4.2.1 Key-related classes 
The KeyGenerator class is responsible for generating both public key and secret 
key. KeyService stores clients’ public keys and clients store their own secret keys. As 
the trusted third party, KeyService also distributes public keys when requests are 
received from clients. Each class has a clear and independent functionality so that 
flexibility and reusability are achieved. KeyGenerator could be used in other projects. 
KeyService could also easily substitute current KeyGenerator with another one. 
4.2.2 Client-related classes 
     ClientDefinition defines the common properties of all clients. This design 
avoids redundant code and reflects a good practice of encapsulation. Various types of 
concrete client classes could inherit from it. Currently there are three: ClientAlice, 
ClientBob and ClientCarol, which represent the three different parties mentioned in 
previous chapters. More clients could be added in the future. Clients also need to 
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handle cryptography, nonces and confounder issues. These requirements are fulfilled 
by three independent classes: Encryptor, Decryptor and RandomNumGenerator so 
that they can be reused. 
4.2.3 Message-related classes 
Messages could be categorized into two types: RequestMessage and 
ResponseMessage. These two classes plus Message class capture common properties 
of messages. A few concrete message classes extend these two classes. This design is 
very flexible, since new message class can be added easily by simply adding 
additional specializations. Figure 4-5 describes different message classes and their 
relationships. 
 
Figure 4-5: Class diagram of messages 
4.3 Functional Requirements 
In software engineering, functional requirements capture the intended behavior 
of the system. This behavior may be expressed as calculations, technical details, data 
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manipulation or other specific functionality the system is required to perform [12]. 
The detailed functional requirements for the MRSecureMessaging are as follows: 
4.3.1 Data Sources Requirements 
1. The MRSecureMessaging should allow data sources to authenticate the 
MPI. 
2. The MRSecureMessaging should allow data sources to encrypt healthcare 
information. 
2.1 The MRSecureMessaging should allow data sources to encrypt PII 
with MPI’s public key. 
2.2 The MRSecureMessaging should allow data sources to encrypt other 
private healthcare information with ECDW’s public key. 
3. The MRSecureMessaging should allow data sources to deliver healthcare 
information to the ECDW through MPI. 
4.3.2 MPI Requirements 
1. The MRSecureMessaging should allow MPI to authenticate the ECDW. 
2. The MRSecureMessaging should allow MPI to access sufficient PII to 
coordinate data. 
2.1 The MRSecureMessaging should allow MPI to decrypt PII with its 
own private key. 
3. The MRSecureMessaging must prevent MPI from accessing other private 
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healthcare information. 
4. The MRSecureMessaging should allow MPI to deliver coordinated, 
de-identified healthcare information to the ECDW. 
4.3.3 ECDW Requirement 
1. The MRSecureMessaging should allow ECDW to receive coordinated, 
de-identified healthcare information. 
1.1 The MRSecureMessaging should allow ECDW to decrypt received 
information with its own private key. 
4.4 Non-functional Requirements 
A non-functional requirement defines how a system is supposed to be, in other 
words, it is a requirement that specifies criteria that can be used to judge the operation 
of a system, rather than specific behaviors [13]. Followings are 
MRSecureMessaging’s non-functional requirements: 
1. Operating System 
1.1 The MRSecureMessaging should be compatible with the Microsoft 
Windows operating system. 
2. Languages and Platform 
2.1 The programming language should be C# (C-Sharp). 
2.2 UML should be used to document the system analysis, specification 
and architectural design 
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2.3 The system should use Vitruvian for distribution. 
3. Quality Control 
3.1 The system should have comprehensive unit tests for each class. 
3.2 Integration testing is essential to ensure functionality, reliability and 
performance of the MRSecureMessaging. 
4. Documentation 
4.1 Design documents and a report about the system should be given to 
assist the end users in understanding the design and functionalities of 
the MRSecureMessaging. 
5. Logging 
5.1 The system should use Vitruvian framework to support logging. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 
Software architecture is the process of defining a structured solution that meets 
all of the technical and operational requirements, while optimizing common quality 
attributes such as performance, security and manageability. It involves a series of 
decisions based on a wide range of factors and each of these decisions can have 
considerable impact on the quality, performance, maintainability and overall success 
of the application [14]. A good architectural design should have high cohesion and 
loose coupling so that the application can be easily understood, maintained, reused 
and tested. 
The MRSecureMessaging’s design needs to address two concerns. The first one 
is flexibility. The MRSecureMessaging’s classes should be designed with good 
encapsulation so that if one class is changed later, the others won’t be affected. In this 
way, future update will be greatly facilitated. The second concern is reusability. This 
includes two aspects: first, the MRSecureMessaging’s classes should have very clear 
functionality so that they could be reused in other projects; second, the 
MRSecureMessaging should also try to reuse code from other projects, for instance, 
code from Vitruvian framework. This could help the programmer to focus on solving 
specific problems and keep them away from handling bottom layer issues. Section 5.1 
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covers these two concerns by illustrating the packages and reusable components of the 
MRSecureMessaging. Section 5.2, Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 explain the design 
decisions and dependencies of individual packages separately. 
5.1 MRSecureMessaging System Design 
The Vitruvian Framework provides a service-oriented architecture that 
distributes objects using dynamically generated proxies that are specializations of the 
application classes [15]. It also facilitates serialization and logging. 
 
Figure 5-1: The MRSecureMessaging’s abstract class diagram 
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Figure 5-1 shows the MRSecureMessaging’s abstract class diagram. The 
package Vitruvian contains classes and methods for distributing and logging. It also 
contains classes and methods for serialization and communications. Specifically, the 
KeyService class implements an IService interface. In another word, it extends 
DistributedService class which implements an IService interface. This class contains 
the method required for distributing public keys. Package Client uses BinarySerializer 
and BinaryDeserializer that are defined in package Vitruvian.Serialization. Package 
Messages contains various types of messages which extend generic Message class in 
package Vitruvian.Communicatons. 
5.2 Design Decisions and Dependencies of Package Messages 
Authentication is a core functionality of the MRSecureMessaging. To realize 
this functionality, each principal needs various types of messages. Package Messages 
is designed for this purpose. Fortunately, Vitruvian has provided related classes in it. 
Figure 5-2 shows them in details. 
 
Figure 5-2: Message classes of Vitruvian 
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The Messages package contains four message classes that inherit from 
RequestMessage and two message classes inherit from ResponseMessage. 
Acknowledge is a reply to AuthenticationFeedback, OriginalDataMessage and 
ForwardedDataMessage. Obviously, it replies different requests with different 
information. AckInfos stores this information in it. Similarly, MessageTypes includes 
different message types (see Figure 5-3). ForwardedData contains data which needs 
to be forwarded in it. 
 
Figure 5-3: Messages classes of the MRSecureMessaging 
5.3 Design Decisions and Dependencies of package Security 
All security-related classes are defined in this package to improve reusability 
and reduce redundant code (see Figure 5-4).  
As the names would imply, Encryptor and Decryptor are a pair of classes 
designed for encrypting and decrypting messages. They are designed in this way so 
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that reusability and flexibility are achieved. Each of them has a static method in it. 
When a client wants to encrypt/decrypt a message, it just needs to pass the 
corresponding key to Encryptor/Decryptor’s method. Since these two classes are in an 
independent package, they can also be used in other places as long as the 
cryptography algorithms are the same. 
 
Figure 5-4: Security-related classes of the MRSecureMessaging 
RandomNumGenerator generates nonces and confounders which both are 
random numbers essentially. The object of this class is also contained in 
ClientDefinition class. 
PublicKey stores other principals’ public key, but it also contains a timestamp in 
it to record the time when this public key is received. Once this public key expires, the 
client will ask KeyService for a new one. 
DataWrapper is a simple wrapper which has two byte arrays in it to store two 
encrypted data. This class is closely related to three other classes: ForwardedData, 
OriginaldataMessage and ForwardedDataMessage. The first client would encrypt the 
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objects of the first two classes separately and put them into DataWrapper when he is 
sending data to the second client. The second client would remove the 
OriginaldataMessage in that wrapper object and substitute it with 
ForwardedDataMessage when he is forwarding data to the third client. 
5.4 Design Decisions and Dependencies of package Client 
This package contains classes and methods related to authentication protocol 
and data distribution. The Vitruvian framework is also used in it. ClientDefinition is 
the base class which contains all fundamental attributes in it. ClientAlice, ClientBob 
and ClientCarol inherit this class and contain authentication related methods 
respectively. 
Clients need to communicate with each other. To realize this, ClientDefinition 
extends an abstract class called DistributedService in Vitruvian. This class simplifies 
the process of distributing applications, and makes it possible to distribute the 
application anywhere in the software development cycle. BinarySerializer and 
BinaryDeserializer are also defined in Vitruvian. ClientDefinition uses them to 
serialize messages or deserialize byte arrays. Other attributes like client name, client 
id, guest id and key storages are also contained in its definition (see Figure 5-5).  
ClientAlice, ClientBob and ClientCarol have authentication related methods in 
them. These methods could be categorized into two types: local method and remote 
procedure call. Local method typically has three steps: first, generate a message; 
second, serialize this message into a byte array; third, encrypt this byte array with the 
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recipient’s public key. Remote procedure call has six steps: first, decrypt the input 
with its secret key; second, deserialize the byte array from the first step into a message 
object; third, check if the information contained in this message is as expected or not. 
If yes, generate corresponding response message and follow the same three steps as 
used in local method. If no, log an error. 
 
Figure 5-5: Client classes and their inheritance hierarchy 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
The MRSecureMessaging is implemented in C# programming language on 
the .NET Framework 4.5, using the Vitruvian Framework to the handle key and data 
distribution. The following sections introduce what implementation challenges were 
met and how they were addressed. Section 6.1 gives a brief introduction to Vitruvian 
Framework and how it is used in the MRSecureMessaging. Section 6.2 describes the 
cryptography algorithm used in the MRSecureMessaging. 
6.1 Introduction to Vitruvian Distribution 
One of the key functionalities of the MRSecureMessaging is distributing 
various types of information (include public key, authentication messages and 
healthcare information). This is also the main challenge encountered when 
implementing it.  
The Vitruvian Framework provides a service-oriented architecture that 
distributes objects using dynamically generated proxies that are specializations of the 
application classes [15]. These proxies use one or more SyncPatterns to manage the 
synchronization between all the replicas of a given patient object. Because the 
SyncPattern is external to the proxy, it can be changed dynamically. A proxy type 
overrides designated methods and properties in the original type and seamlessly 
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connects them to the synchronization patterns. A programmer can declare a 
synchronization pattern by simply adding an attribute to a property or method. Since 
the communication and synchronization are handled by the framework, there is no 
differentiation between a local object and a distributed object from a programmer's 
perspective. 
The Vitruvian Framework has several different types of SyncPatterns. As 
described in Chapter 5, the SyncPattern used in the MRSecureMessaging is Remote 
Procedure Call or RPC. In RPC, procedures on remote machines can be called as if 
they are procedures in the local address space. The underlying RPC system then hides 
important aspects of distribution, including the encoding and decoding of parameters 
and results, the passing of messages and the preserving of the required semantics for 
the procedure call [16]. 
Take public key distribution as an example to illustrate this implementation 
details. First, at KeyService side, the function needs to be annotated like this: 
 
Figure 6-1: Sample remote procedure call code 
A proxy of KeyService would be generated at client side. When a client is 
requesting a public key, it simply calls this proxy’s GetPublicKey method as if it is a 
local method. Figure 6-2 shows the details of the remote proxy and Figure 6-3 shows 
the details of the local proxy (“r” means remote and “l” means local). 
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Figure 6-2: RPC remote proxy 
 
Figure 6-3: RPC local proxy 
6.2 Cryptographic Algorithm 
The MRSecureMessaging utilizes RSA algorithm [5] for encryption and 
decryption. It works as follow: 
1. pick two large primes p and q, let n = p * q 
2. choose e relatively prime to ø(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) 
3. use Euclid’s algorithm to generate a d such that e * d = 1 mod ø(n) 
4. make the pair (n, e) publicly available – this is the public key. The secret 
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key is d 
5. a message block M is now encrypted by calculating C = Me mod n 
6. the encrypted block C is decrypted by calculating M = Cd mod n 
The .Net Framework 4.5 provides the RSACryptoServiceProvider for this 
purpose. This class creates a public/secret key pair when the default constructor is 
used to create a new instance. After a new instance of the class is created, the key 
information can be exported in to two formats: either a string of XML representation 
or an RSAParameters structure. You can also use a Boolean value to indicate whether 
to return only the public key information or to return both the public key and the 
secret key information.  
In KeyGenerator, keys are exported into XML representation. On KeyService 
side, only public keys are exported; On client side, both public keys and secret keys 
are exported. 
Secret keys should never be stored verbatim or in plain text on the local 
computer. A key container is needed to store it. Specifically, CspParameters is used in 
the MRSecureMessaging. This is another class provided by the .Net Framework; it 
guarantees secret keys cannot easily be compromised. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SOFTWARE TESTING 
7.1 Introduction 
Software testing is an investigation conducted to provide stakeholders with 
information about the quality of the product or service under test [31]. Software 
testing can also provide an objective, independent view of the software to allow the 
business to appreciate and understand the risks of software implementation [17]. 
Software testing involves the execution of a software component or system to 
evaluate one or more properties of interest. In general, these properties indicate the 
extent to which the component or system under test [17]: 
• meets the requirements that guided its design and development,  
• responds correctly to all kinds of inputs,  
• performs its functions within an acceptable time,  
• is sufficiently usable,  
• can be installed and run in its intended environments, and 
• achieves the general result its stakeholders desire. 
From the above we could conclude that testing is more than just debugging. But 
debugging is still a very important part of testing. Software bugs will almost always 
exist in any software module with moderate size: not because programmers are 
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careless or irresponsible, but because the complexity of software is generally 
intractable, and humans have only limited ability to manager complexity. It is also 
true that for any complex systems, design defects can never be completely ruled out 
[18]. 
Testing is also expensive. Typically, more than 50% percent of the development 
time is spent in testing [18]. So testing is a trade-off between budget, time and quality. 
The MRSecureMessaging is thoroughly tested. Section 6.2 discusses the unit 
testing and Section 6.3 explains the integration testing. 
7.2 Unit Testing 
Unite testing, also known as component testing, refers tests that verify the 
functionality of a specific section of code, usually at the function level. In an 
object-oriented environment, this is usually at the class level, and the minimal unit 
tests include the constructors and destructors [32]. Unit testing alone cannot verify the 
functionality of a piece of software, but rather is used to ensure that the building 
blocks of the software work independently from each other [17]. 
Extensive test cases have written for almost all classes in the 
MRSecureMessaging. These classes include various message classes, client classes, 
KeyGenerator, KeyService, Encryptor and Decryptor. Test cases were designed such 
that they met MRSecureMessaging’s functional requirement discussed in Chapter 4. 
Different types of inputs that user may provide were also covered in those test cases. 
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7.3 Integration Testing 
Integration testing is the phase in software testing in which individual software 
modules are combined and tested as a group. It occurs after unit testing. Integration 
testing takes as its input modules that have been unit tested, groups them in a larger 
aggregates, applies tests defined in an integration test plan to those aggregates, and 
delivers as its output the integrated system ready for further testing [19]. Integration 
testing works to expose defects in the interfaces and interaction between integrated 
components. Progressively larger groups of tested software components 
corresponding to elements of the architectural design are integrated and tested until 
the software works as a system [17].  
For this project, testing focused on the flows of key/authentication/data from 
one component to another. Specifically, they are as follows: 
1. Testing of communication between clients and KeyService 
2. Testing of authentication process between clients 
3. Testing of data (PII and other confidential data) flow between ClientAlice 
and ClientBob 
4. Testing of data (coordinated, de-identified data) flow between ClientBob 
and ClientCarol 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY 
The MRSecureMessaging utilizes a reliable public key cryptographic algorithm 
to encrypt PII and other confidential data to make sure that phMPI and data 
consumers can only access their own data. It also contains the built-in customized 
Needham-Schroeder protocol that allows data sources to authenticate the intended 
recipients. Specifically, data sources first use it to verify recipients and then encrypt 
different types of data with different keys so that only corresponding recipients can 
decrypt it. This approach guarantees privacy, security and communication efficiency. 
Although the MRSecureMessaging is specific to the ECCS, it can actually be 
used in any system where secure communication is needed. With minor changes, it 
could be used in two-client communication or multiple-client (more than three) 
communication. It can also be used in systems where access control is needed. The 
design of the MRSecureMessaging strictly follows the software engineering 
principles which allow high cohesion and loose coupling among classes. Modules are 
easy to understand, maintain and reuse. Changes in one module do not affect other 
modules. 
Future work could focus on changing the cryptographic algorithms used in it. 
The MRSecureMessaging is using public key cryptographic algorithm right now. If 
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symmetric cryptographic algorithm is needed in future, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
communication architecture will be changed dramatically and becomes more 
complicated. The trade-off between these two architectures will need further research. 
While working on this project, I had the opportunity to practice the theory and 
principles learned from software engineering class and object-oriented software 
development class. I also gained experience from almost all phases of the software 
development process. These precious experiences improved my skills in documenting, 
implementing and testing. It also improved my system design ability and coding style. 
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